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Abstract Background: The clinical reasoning processes which result in the forma- tion of a diagnosis, are 
fundamental for safe, effective and efficient clinical prac- tice and are central to professional autonomy and 
accountability. While research has identified the diagnostic reasoning approaches taken by a range of healthcare 
professions, there is limited understanding of how osteopaths formulate diagnoses in clinical practice. 
Objectives: The aim of this research was to explore the diagnostic reasoning of experienced osteopaths in the 
UK. 
Methods: A qualitative constructivist grounded theory approach was taken in this study, which was situated in the 
interpretive research paradigm. A total of seven- teen face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with twelve experi- enced osteopaths. Participants were purposefully and theoretically sampled to take part in 
this study. Data collection methods involved semi-structured interviews with participants and observation and 
video-recording of clinical appointments, which were followed by video-prompted reflective interviews. The 
constant comparative method of analysis was used to code and analyse data. 
Results: The findings suggest that when formulating a diagnosis practitioners adopted two diagnostic 
reasoning approaches, namely hypothetico-deductive reasoning and pattern recognition. In this study, there 
was interplay of these reasoning approaches as a result of the perceived level of complexity and degree of 
familiarity of the patient presentation. 
Conclusions: Experienced osteopaths adopted diagnostic reasoning approaches which are akin to other 
healthcare professions including medicine and physio- therapy. Metacognitive and refl xivity skills were central 
for safe and effective diagnostic reasoning. Further work is required to explore the transferability of these 
findings with practitioners of different levels of clinical experience and who work in different clinical settings. 
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Introduction 
 
Clinical reasoning refers to the social, cognitive 
and interactive processes by which practitioners 
make decisions in practice.1 Specifically, diag- 
nostic reasoning refers to the reasoning processes 
which result in the formation of a diagnosis, often 
related to patients’ physical disability and 
impairment with consideration of associated pain 
mechanisms, tissue pathology, and potential and 
wide-ranging contributing factors.2 Researchers 
across the healthcare professions have been 
attempting to understand the processes of clinical 
reasoning for more than forty-five years, with the 
majority of the research focusing primarily on the 
process practitioners use to arrive at a diagnosis.3 
 
Approaches to clinical reasoning 
research 
 
Since clinical reasoning is a social and cognitive 
process and therefore resides in the ‘head’ of the 
practitioner, largely hidden from observers4 this 
poses a challenge for researchers wanting to 
explore this area  of  clinical  practice.  A  range 
of research methods, operating in different 
research paradigms, have been used to investigate 
the  different  aspects  of  clinical  reasoning.4,5 
Throughout the last five decades, there have been 
notable trends in the methodologies and theories of 
clinical reasoning research. The medical profession 
were amongst the first to actively research clinical 
reasoning and have strongly influenced the 
reasoning approaches adopted in other health pro- 
fessions.5 Research into clinical reasoning has used 
both qualitative and quantitative methodological 
approaches to data gathering and analysis. Early 
medical researchers of clinical reasoning in the 
1970s operated predominantly in the positivist/ 
post-positivist paradigm, using largely quantitative 
research approaches.6 However, more recent 
clinical reasoning research in other healthcare 
professions  including  physiotherapy,2,7,8   occupa- 
tional therapy9e11 and nursing12e14 has operated 
within the interpretive research paradigm, using 
qualitative methodologies. 
Quantitative approaches are well suited to 
limit, test or measure specific aspects of clinical 
reasoning (for example, ‘do experts or novices 
generate more differential diagnoses?’), while 
qualitative methods will illuminate factors which 
can help to explain and understand an individual’s 
clinical reasoning (for example, ‘how do practi- 
tioners structure their treatment and management 
plan?’).3 Whether taking a quantitative or quali- 
tative approach, observation and/or video- 
recording of treatment sessions, interviews with 
practitioners and patients, and written materials 
from the practitioners (for example, reflective 
diaries) have served as data collection methods in 
clinical reasoning research, all with varying 
strengths and weaknesses (for an overview see 
Unsworth4). 
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The development of diagnostic 
reasoning research 
 
In the late 1970s, researchers attempted to gain an 
understanding of the diagnostic reasoning pro- 
cesses used within medicine. Using students of 
different educational levels15 or a combination of 
students and physicians,16 these studies observed 
participants’ interaction with patients during a 
clinical appointment. Participants then gave a 
real-time  verbal  description,  either  during  the 
 
deductive reasoning, but rather used direct 
retrieval of information from a well-developed 
knowledge base to support their analysis of pre- 
senting data and subsequent hypothesis generation, 
termed ‘pattern recognition’. Pattern recognition, 
also known as ‘forward reasoning’, contrasts with 
the cyclical process of hypothesis generation and 
testing (also referred to as ‘backward reasoning’). 
Patel and Groen25 proposed that novices tend to use 
processes such as means-ends analysis and 
generate-and-test methods that involve slower 
backward reasoning. Barrows and Feltovich26 
posited that practitioners use hypothetico- 
deductive reasoning as a means to store new clin- 
ical patterns in their memory which may be relied 
upon when a similar clinical situation arises. 
Further research has suggested that when con- 
fronted with a complex or unfamiliar problem, 
expert   medical   practitioners   resort   back   to 
26e28 
interaction (‘think aloud’) or alternatively after hypothetico-deductive  reasoning. Although 
the patient encounter, whilst also viewing a video- 
recording of the clinical appointment, termed 
‘stimulated recall’. Drawing on previous research 
efficient, pattern recognition can be error prone 
and reducing the hazards associated with pattern 
recognition  requires  a  strong  domain  specific 
27 
comparing the performance of master and novice knowledge and metacognitive processes. Jones 
chess players,17,18 Elstein and colleagues19 took an 
observational approach to study diagnostic 
reasoning, by investigating how ‘expert’d medical 
practitioners solved clinical problems and arrived 
at a diagnosis. The results of these studies showed 
and colleagues highlight how to avoid the potential 
hazards of pattern recognition and state that 
“learning and being able to recognise common 
clinical patterns and their variations while mini- 
mising the risks and limitations of pattern recogni- 
29,p.250 
that expert practitioners began to formulate mul- tion requires metacognition”. The ability of 
tiple hypotheses early on in the patient encounter 
and that the diagnostic accuracy was closely 
related to previous exposure and experience of 
specific types of patient cases. The key finding of 
the practitioner to self-reflect and ‘know what they 
know and what they don’t know’ affords them the 
ability to monitor their data collection and is 
thought to be a vital part of expert practice in 
21,29 
Elstein’s study was that diagnostic reasoning 
involved four steps: 1) data or ‘cue’ acquisition 
(initial observation, case history, examination 
findings); 2) hypothesis formation; 3) interpreta- 
tion of the data (‘weighing of evidence’); followed 
by 4) a search to prove (or disprove) the evidence 
physiotherapy. 
Since the seminal clinical reasoning studies of 
the 1970s and 1980s, research has shown that 
hypothetico-deductive reasoning and pattern 
recognition approaches are core strategies in the 
diagnostic  reasoning  of  a  range  of  healthcare 
12,13 
(hypothesis  evaluation).19   What  emerged  from professionals  including  nurses, 9,30 occupational 2,7,8,31,32 
Elstein’s seminal work was an early general model 
of  medical  diagnostic  reasoning,  termed  the 
therapists and physiotherapists. 
‘hypothetico-deductive’ method.24 
Later, in the 1980s, medical researchers began 
focusing  on  the  different  ways  in  which expert 
physicians organised and structured their knowledge 
in relation to their diagnostic reasoning. Groen and 
Patel25 identified that during non-problematic situ- 
ations, experts did not rely solely on hypothetico- 
 
 
 
d The concept of the ‘expert’ is problematic, and researchers 
currently have a limited understanding of the nature of exper- 
tise in healthcare (for example see, Mylopoulos et al.,20 Jensen 
et al.21,22  and Petty et al.23). 
Diagnostic reasoning and osteopathy 
 
In the UK and the antipodes, osteopaths are auton- 
omous manual therapy professionals who require a 
broad ranging knowledge and skill base in order to 
diagnose, treat and manage patients with a variety 
of musculoskeletal and non-musculoskeletal condi- 
tions which present in clinical practice.33,34 With 
regards to presenting symptoms, spinal pain is by far 
the most common condition treated by osteopaths in 
the UK.33,34 Practitioners employ a broad spectrum 
of  therapeutic  interventions,  with  manipulative 
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techniques (such as spinal mobilisation and high- 
velocity thrust manipulation) as the preferred form 
of treatment modalities for practitioners in the 
UK33e35 as well as internationally.36,37 For example, 
a 2001 survey of the UK osteopathic profession con- 
ducted by the GOsC,33 showed that almost 75% of 
responders regularly used joint mobilisation tech- 
niques, and almost 50% regularly used high-velocity 
thrust techniques, as part of their treatment, and 
similar statistics are supported by more recent 
research.34,35 
In view of the wide range of treatment 
interventions employed by practitioners and the 
diversity and complexity of problems that patients 
present with in clinical practice, well developed 
clinical reasoning skills are essential to osteopaths. 
Specifically, diagnostic reasoning is fundamental 
to safe and effective osteopathic practice and is 
central to professional autonomy and account- 
ability. Furthermore, the current standards of 
osteopathic practice demand that practitioners in 
the UK are able to evaluate patients effectively in 
order to “make a working diagnosis and formulate 
a treatment plan”.38,p.13  The most recent stan- 
dards of practice set out by the GOsC explicitly 
state that osteopaths are required to have “prob- 
lem-solving and thinking skills in order to inform 
and guide the interpretation of clinical and other 
data, and to justify clinical reasoning and decision- 
making”.38,p.9 Similar competencies in diagnostic 
reasoning are echoed by the osteopathic regula- 
tors in Australia,39 New Zealand40 and are found in 
benchmarks for osteopathic training worldwide.41 
Although  several  osteopathic  models  of  diag- 
nostic reasoning models have been proposed 
theoretically42e44 there is little-to-no published 
research  exploring  the  diagnostic  reasoning  of 
osteopaths. Therefore a knowledge gap exists 
between the diagnostic reasoning skills espoused 
and stipulated by osteopathic regulators and the 
actual diagnostic reasoning skills of practitioners 
which take place in-action, during real-world 
clinical practice. 
Research from a range of healthcare professions 
has shown that well developed diagnostic reasoning 
skills are fundamental to clinical expertise (for 
example in physiotherapy2,21,45,46 and medi- 
cine47e49). Developing a research-based knowledge 
of the diagnostic reasoning processes used by os- 
teopaths would be valuable to educators and 
practitioners and ultimately help enhance patient 
care.3 Finally, issues surrounding the nature, 
uniqueness and role of osteopathy in modern-day 
healthcare are continually debated by the profes- 
sion internationally (see for example the Special 
Edition of this journal on osteopathic principles50); 
therefore research which investigates how osteo- 
paths make clinical and diagnostic decisions is able 
to generate knowledge which sheds light on these 
fundamental areas of professional practice. 
This paper explores the diagnostic reasoning of 
experienced osteopaths and the findings from this 
study form part of a broader theory of clinical 
decision-making and therapeutic approaches re- 
ported  elsewhere.51e54 
 
Methods 
 
Study design 
 
A constructivist grounded theory55 approach was 
taken in this qualitative study, which was situated 
in the interpretive research paradigm. A total of 
seventeen face-to-face semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with twelve experienced osteo- 
paths, three of which took place immediately after 
observation of a clinical appointment which was 
also video-recorded. These three reflective in- 
terviews were prompted by the video-recording, 
which facilitated participants’ to reflect more 
deeply on their reasoning and helped to ensure the 
interview discussion was firmly grounded in their 
actions, reasoning and decisions, which took place 
during the clinical appointment.56 
In line with grounded theory, data collection and 
analysis occurred in parallel, in an iterative 
fashion.55 The constant comparative method of 
analysis was used to code and analyse interview 
data.55 This method of analysis involved the primary 
research (OT) comparing data with data, data with 
category, category with category and facilitated the 
active construction of codes and categories with 
increasing level of abstraction.55 Memos were 
written throughout the study data collection and 
analysis, and helped to identify and define codes, 
patterns and relationships in the data as well as 
encouraging researcher reflexivity.55 Data collec- 
tion and analysis continued until no new analytical 
insights became apparent, suggesting theoretical 
sufficiency had been attained.55 
Table 1 provides examples of interview ques- 
tions which were used to explore participants’ 
diagnostic reasoning. All interviews were audio- 
recorded and transcribed verbatim. The methods 
used in this study have been presented in detail 
elsewhere.51,53,54 
 
Participants 
 
A total of twelve UK registered osteopaths were 
purposefully  and  theoretically  sampled  to  take 
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part in this study. Participants were recruited from 
osteopathic educational institutions and through 
adverts placed in the national osteopathic press. 
Participants’ biographical information is provided 
in Table 2. Approval was granted by the Faculty of 
Health and Social Science Research Ethics and 
Governance Committee at the University of 
Brighton and the Ethics Committee of the British 
College of Osteopathic Medicine. 
 
 
Findings 
 
A major goal of all participants was establishing an 
explanation of the patient’s problem. All partici- 
pants initially sought to differentiate between a 
serious pathology that would require referral to a 
medical practitioner  and a condition that was 
within their expertise and scope of practice. All 
participants appeared to spend time focusing on 
patient’s manifestations of disease and dysfunc- 
tion, (i.e. clinical signs and symptoms) with the 
aim of measuring and defining the patient’s con- 
dition. For clarity, the diagnostic reasoning pro- 
cess is presented in the following three stages; 
however the actual process was iterative across 
all three: 
 
• Focusing on signs and symptoms 
• Generating and testing hypotheses 
• Recognising patterns 
 
Focusing on signs and symptoms 
 
When reasoning diagnostically, participants’ 
attention  was  focused  on  patients’  signs  and 
 
 
 
 
symptoms, and through specific clinical action, 
such as examination procedures, they sought to 
acquire cues which would help to explain the 
cause of the patient’s problem. All participants 
were interested in the precise nature and behav- 
iour of patients’ symptoms such as the location of 
pain, type of pain, and whether there were any 
associated symptoms. These initial cues formed 
the basis of ideas or hypotheses about what might 
be the cause of the patients’ problem. These hy- 
potheses were tested by specific questioning, or 
performing precise procedures and actions (such 
as clinical testing and examination). These actions 
produced additional cues which allowed possible 
hypotheses to be refined, accepted or discarded: 
I look for associated symptoms, and I try, with the 
best possible attempt, to pinpoint dysfunction or 
tissue causing symptoms, or perhaps more cen- 
trally maintained pain states. (P3) 
 
If they’ve [the patient] come in with left-sided 
chest or heart problems, I’d be doing a cardio- 
vascular screening, so I always test the most 
dangerous things first. (P5) 
At the centre of participants’ thinking were the 
presenting signs and symptoms, results of clinical 
tests, questions, and thoughts regarding possible 
hypotheses regarding a causal explanation of the 
patients’ problem. When focusing on the signs and 
symptoms of the patient’s presenting problem, 
participant’s thinking was directed predominately 
towards determining causeeeffect relationships, 
the meaning of biomedical cues, and developing 
Table 2 Biographical information of study 
participants. 
Mean age 43.5 (range 30e56) 
Mean years in 15 (range 6e25) 
clinical practice 
Gender 
 
Work setting 
Education 
10 males 
2 females 
All worked in private clinical 
practice 
10 held additional roles as 
clinical tutors or lecturers at 
an OEI 
All had undergraduate 
qualifications in osteopathy 
(BSc, DO) 
4 held additional 
postgraduate degrees (MSc) 
OEI e Osteopathic Educational Institution; BSc e Bachelor of 
Science; DO e  Diploma in Osteopathy; MSc e  Master of 
Science. 
Table  1 Example of interview questions used to 
explore participants’ diagnostic reasoning. 
Imagine we are in your clinic, and you are about to 
see a new patient. Let’s say it’s a patient with back 
pain. Please take me through your thinking 
process, as you work out what’s wrong with this 
patient. 
As you do this test/examination etc what are you 
focusing on? What are you thinking about? How 
does this help you decide what’s causing the 
patients problem? 
Has the patients’ condition met with your 
expectations? How does this make you feel/think? 
What were your main concerns about this patient? 
Did anything take you by surprise while caring for 
the patient? How do you feel in that situation? 
How did you know it was safe to proceed with this 
patient? 
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hypotheses. It appeared that the constructed 
diagnosis was the result of participants’ own 
interpretation of the patient’s signs and 
symptoms: 
The elements of the case history, the nature of 
the onset of the pain, diurnal variation, and those 
kinds of things will tend to lead me towards 
implicating certain tissues perhaps more than 
others. (P7) 
 
If the person’s presenting with paresthesia in the 
limb or in the hands or the feet I want to know 
which nerve root is involved. (P8) 
Having focused on the presenting signs and 
symptoms to acquire cues in order to help explain 
the patient’s condition, practitioners sought to 
obtain an explanation of the patient’s condition 
which they considered to be ‘correct’ and ‘true’. 
During the process of diagnosis construction, par- 
ticipants appeared to adopt one of two different 
diagnostic reasoning approaches; hypothetico- 
deductive reasoning19 or pattern recognition,57 
and are presented below. 
 
Generating and testing hypotheses 
 
For all participants, focusing on patients’ signs 
and symptoms during examination procedures 
enabled them to acquire cues which would help 
develop hypotheses and guide further examina- 
tion and treatment. Initial cues formed the basis 
of ideas or hypotheses about what might be the 
cause of patients’ condition, and all participants 
directed their reasoning towards ‘sieving out’ a 
potentially serious cause of patients’ symptoms: 
I’m trying to decide “bi-lateral leg pain- where 
does that leave me”? And I am thinking “is there 
some sort of aneurysm? Is it degeneration on both 
sides of his spine? Is there a normal reason for that 
going on?” (P12) 
 
I make sure that I do my best to rule out anything 
that I shouldn’t [treat] e I’m working with my fear 
that I don’t want to start treating pathology or 
something non-musculoskeletal. (P6) 
Several participants commented that their hy- 
potheses were evaluated by deliberately acquiring 
further cues via specific questioning and clinical 
examination procedures, which resulted in hy- 
potheses being modified, accepted or rejected: 
In my head I have a rolling selection of differential 
diagnoses that I aim to rule out with clinical 
investigation. (P3) 
If the patient was complaining of posterior thigh 
pain, I want to determine what I think is the 
structure and where that is being compromised in 
its function. (P8) 
When faced with unfamiliar symptoms, several 
participants commented that they employed a 
methodical and purposeful process of collecting 
clinical information, developing and evaluating 
their hypotheses. This ‘step-by-step’ process ten- 
ded to occur when they were confronted with a 
challenging, complex or unfamiliar problem, and 
two participants commented: 
I rarely now write out a list of differentials, 
sometimes I do when I’m really stumped. If I really 
haven’t got a good clue, then I spend a few sec- 
onds just thinking what it could be, and write it 
out. (P2) 
 
I’m thinking about maybe it’s something systemic, 
have I missed anything in the prostate, in the 
abdomen and anything else gynaecologically?. [So] 
I need to really think about why the back pain isn’t 
getting any better. (P5) 
 
 
Recognising patterns 
 
All participants formulated ideas and hypotheses 
about the cause of the patient’s problem by 
obtaining symptom-based cues during their exam- 
ination and history taking. At other times, partic- 
ipants appeared to recognise clusters of cues and 
the relationships between symptoms, suggesting 
they related these patterns of cues to previous 
clinical experiences, allowing them to ‘jump’ 
forward to a diagnosis. For example, some partic- 
ipants recognised clusters of biomechanically- 
related cues during  physical examination  of 
the patient’s body and swiftly arrive at a diagnosis: 
Immediately I could see why the neck wasn’t 
allowing that movement and why he was hesitant 
to do that movement. And it [the diagnosis] was 
quite frankly already there when he sat there. 
(P11) 
Several participants commented on the ease of 
which they could arrive at a diagnosis, especially 
when they encountered a patient with a problem 
which appeared simple or similar to previous 
experiences: 
I am eighty per cent of the way there just after 
the case history and questioning, and usually that 
twenty per cent confirmation takes place during 
the  rest  of  the  time.You  build  up  a  better 
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repertoire of remembering pain patterns and 
onset causes and histories, and so on. And that 
back catalogue of data helps you get to an answer 
quickly. (P4) 
 
I look at the patient’s age, region of pain, area 
that they had the problem. Then immediately 
start thinking, ‘well what is it likely to be’, just 
based on the symptomology. so by  the time I 
finish the history I think ‘O.K, I think this persons 
got either, a rotator cuff tendonopathy, or it 
could be referred [pain]’. (P2) 
Recognising relationships between clinical cues, 
such as specific clinical signs and symptoms, meant 
that diagnoses could be verified and confirmed 
through further clinical assessment, enabling par- 
ticipants to construct a diagnosis more efficiently, in 
less time and with less effort. Participants appeared 
to ‘clump’ chunks of clinical information together to 
arrive at a diagnosis, which could be verified or 
modified through further clinical examination. If a 
pattern was recognised, participants could imme- 
diately evaluate and test their hypotheses: 
My mind might be thinking this is a typical facet 
joint problem.so I will go through the procedure 
of looking above and below and those joint closer 
to examine them. (P1) 
 
Within the first few minutes, well a minute of him 
talking, I felt the lesion [diagnosis] was the most 
probable. And I was looking for other reasons 
thereafter, to see whether it could have been 
anything else. [but] quite frankly I just knew what 
it was and I can’t think what else it could be. (P11) 
For most participants the nature of a diagnosis 
centred on a mechanical, physical and objective 
entity that lay within the patient’s body: 
I think in every osteopathic patient, you end up 
with a diagnosis which is some kind  of tissue 
causing symptom type of scenario. (P9) 
 
.if the patients’ problem is due to osteoarthritis 
of the hip, then you must appreciate that the 
osteoarthritis has caused a shortening of the hip 
musculature and therefore you have to maintain 
as much movement as possible in the hip region 
and remove their pain. (P1) 
 
.manual provocation techniques to reproduce 
their [patients’] symptoms are some of the best 
diagnostic tools. If I can find the exact action that 
produces pain then I can have an idea of what kind 
of tissue is  involved and start  to  think  about 
treatment. (P5) 
 
However, several participants considered and 
explored patients’ pain and dysfunction in the 
context of their family, work and social life during 
their diagnostic reasoning: 
I like to see the  other factors that would be 
influencing the way that they [the patient] expe- 
rience their problem.it gives you a much rounder 
picture of the person you’re treating. (P6) 
 
I pay quite a lot of attention to how a patient has 
pain throughout the day and  throughout their 
life.[and] pain to me is what the patient says it 
is, I’m really less concerned with optimal func- 
tioning of biomechanics and optimal symme- 
try.I’m more concerned with what the patient’s 
pain means to them. (P3) 
These participants commented on the impor- 
tance of considering the multiple factors which 
impact patients’ pain and disability, and suggest 
an emphasis on the psychological and social 
aspects of the patient when constructing a 
diagnosis. 
For all participants, diagnostic reasoning 
constituted a safety procedure whereby they 
ruled out a serious cause of their patients’ 
problem. Participants showed flexibility in their 
diagnostic reasoning and could move between 
hypothetico-deductive and pattern recognition 
approaches. Hypothetico-deductive reasoning 
would be taken when confronted with an unfa- 
miliar or complex problem, so that participants 
could deliberately and carefully collect clinical 
data and deductively generate multiple possible 
diagnoses to be further tested. Alternatively, 
when faced with a familiar or simple patient 
presentation, participants could draw  on their 
previous experiences and recognise meaningful 
patterns and relationships between symptoms, 
enabling them to inductively build a diagnosis 
quickly and effi . The movement between 
hypothetico-deductive reasoning and pattern 
recognition appeared to be linked by the practi- 
tioners’ awareness of, and refl upon their 
own diagnostic reasoning in the context of the 
presenting patient and the clinical situation. The 
comments below provide some examples of par- 
ticipants moving between hypothetico-deductive 
reasoning and pattern recognition: 
If somebody is exhibiting signs that they’re not 
improving I’ll sit back and re-think about it, 
[and] really go through the process again.it’s 
almost taking the process into a much more 
focused and logical process than by doing it by 
intuition. (P5) 
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Figure 1 Interaction between hypothetico-deductive reasoning and pattern recognition. 
 
 
If things [symptoms] hadn’t improved, I would 
then have gone into a much more in-depth analysis 
of the intervertebral. (P10) 
 
The minute anything happens, something unusu- 
al.you train yourself to flick up into the 
conscious level [when] things that are aberrant or 
unusual and require further investigation. (P6) 
Fig. 1 above illustrates how participants would 
adopt either a hypothetico-deductive approach to 
diagnostic reasoning if the patient presented with 
symptoms which were complex of unfamiliar. If 
patients presented with simpler or familiar symp- 
toms, participants could recognise these as ‘pat- 
terns’ and inductively reason to construct a 
diagnosis. 
 
Discussion 
 
To our knowledge, this is the first published 
research investigating the diagnostic reasoning of 
osteopaths. The findings indicate that the diag- 
nostic reasoning of experienced osteopaths 
involved the interaction of hypothetico-deductive 
reasoning and pattern recognition approaches. 
These findings support models of diagnostic 
reasoning proposed theoretically in the osteo- 
pathic literature.43,44,58 The study found that 
when formulating a diagnosis all participants 
adopted two cognitively based diagnostic 
reasoning approaches, consistent with the medical 
literature, namely hypothetico-deductive 
reasoning19 and pattern recognition.59 In this 
study, there was interplay of hypothetico- 
deductive reasoning and pattern recognition, as a 
result of the perceived level of complexity and 
degree of familiarity of the patient presentation. 
This is the first study to indicate an interaction of 
diagnostic  reasoning  approaches  in  relation  to 
 
osteopathy, and supports existing research in 
physiotherapy2,8,60,61 and occupational ther- 
apy,10,30 that experienced practitioners are able to 
move flexibly between diagnostic reasoning ap- 
proaches depending on the nature of the clinical 
situation. 
The conditions under which both diagnostic 
reasoning approaches occur, is also consistent with 
the literature on diagnostic reasoning57,62 and 
more general theories of human cognition and 
decision-making, namely ‘Dual Processing The- 
ory’63e65 and ‘Cognitive Continuum Theory’.66,67 
Under  conditions  of  familiarity,  whereby  the 
experienced practitioners recognised characteris- 
tics of the patient (for example, age and general 
appearance), and characteristics of their illness 
presentation (for example, the location and 
severity of pain, and associated symptoms), they 
recognised patterns and relationships between 
different cues. This enabled practitioners to 
formulate early diagnostic impressions and hy- 
potheses based on the similarity between the 
present situation and previous experience, 
thereby inductively building diagnoses. This 
finding suggests  that  experienced osteopaths 
possessed a well organised knowledge base28 and 
countless similar exemplars,49 which they could 
‘activate’ immediately and automatically. This 
inductive approach to diagnostic reasoning is 
considered to  be a central element of clinical 
reasoning  expertise.8,61,68,69 
However, during unfamiliar conditions or when 
faced with a complex clinical presentation, par- 
ticipants in this study, deliberately and consciously 
used a hypothetico-deductive approach to diag- 
nostic       reasoning.19 Hypothetico-deductive 
reasoning involved practitioners systematically 
acquiring and validating cues through a deliberate 
process of ‘observation and measurement’ (i.e. 
further clinical examination) so that hypotheses 
Cue generation 
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could be rejected, accepted of refined. The 
finding that osteopaths in this study re-examined 
patients and re-evaluated their diagnoses under 
conditions of uncertainty or complexity, such as 
when a patient failed to respond to treatment as 
predicted or if their symptoms worsened, is 
congruent with models of diagnostic reasoning 
developed  from  research2,8   and proposed  theo- 
retically70e72  in musculoskeletal physiotherapy. 
The findings from this study support the existing 
theoretical and research literature that meta- 
cognitive processes form the link between 
hypothetico-deductive reasoning and pattern 
recognition.2,73,74 All participants in this study 
demonstrated the capability to reflect on their 
diagnostic reasoning processes and move between 
different reasoning approaches. Although this 
finding is consistent with existing literature which 
argues that metacognitive skills are associated 
with well-developed clinical reasoning capabil- 
ities,2,21,59 this is the first study to explore meta- 
cognition relation to osteopathic clinical 
reasoning. When constructing a diagnosis, partici- 
pants reflected on the nature of the situation, such 
as its complexity and familiarity, and monitored 
their diagnostic reasoning processes. This finding 
concurs with Eraut who posits that when practi- 
tioners are confronted with a problem, they 
rapidly read the situation and proceed in a state of 
“continued alertness”.75,p.15 This suggests that for 
the experienced osteopaths in this study, meta- 
cognitive and reflective processes are fundamental 
to enabling them to safely negotiate the complex 
situations encountered in professional practice 
and facilitate their development of a diagnosis and 
is congruent with the clinical reasoning capabil- 
ities set out by the regulator in the UK.38 
Osteopathic educators should incorporate stra- 
tegies which nurture the development of students’ 
critical reflection capabilities and enhance their 
problem solving skills so that they can become 
adaptable, reflective and thinking practitioners, 
able to navigate through a professional practice 
setting which is complex, uncertain, unstable, 
unique and value-laden.76 The educational skills of 
clinical tutors could be further developed so that 
they can work with students to emphasise learning 
from practice and decision-making, in order to 
promote an engaged and active learning process 
during clinical education.77 
The findings also have implications for continual 
professional development (CPD). Current CPD may 
focus too heavily on the acquisition of technical 
skills (for example, advanced hands-on skills, 
additional treatment modalities), which are con- 
ducted away from practice. Such CPD courses are 
 
often short, and may not foster and promote 
critically reflective practice and the development 
of diagnostic reasoning and reflexivity skills. CPD 
should enable practitioners to learn from practice 
and increase their capacity to synthesise, blend 
and critically evaluate different sources of 
knowledge, including research evidence. As an 
alternative to short courses and CPD training, peer 
observation of practice78 may help practitioners to 
learn from and in practice and develop their 
diagnostic reasoning and metacognitive skills. 
This study explored the diagnostic reasoning of 
experienced osteopaths, many of which held or had 
held educational positions in osteopathic education 
institutions in the UK. This limited number of per- 
spectives from a limited number of individuals means 
that the transferability79 of the findings to the wider 
osteopathic profession needs to be established 
through further research. This is amongst the first 
research of its kind in osteopathy and there are a 
number of key areas of osteopathic clinical reasoning 
which warrant further exploration. For example, 
research could be carried out to explore the theo- 
retical ‘reach’ of the findings to osteopaths with 
different levels of experience, in other countries or 
practitioners that work in other clinical settings, 
such as the National Health Service. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The findings from this study indicate that experi- 
enced osteopaths adopt hypothetico-deductive 
and pattern recognition approaches to diagnostic 
reasoning. Participants in this study demonstrated 
well-developed metacognitive skills, which 
enabled them to move between two diagnostic 
reasoning approaches depending on the nature of 
the clinical problem and clinical situation. This 
study is amongst the first to provide research- 
based knowledge of this specific and fundamental 
aspect of osteopathic clinical reasoning. The 
findings from this study support the theoretical 
literature on diagnostic reasoning in osteopathy, 
and also suggest that osteopaths’ diagnostic 
reasoning processes are akin to practitioners of 
other healthcare professions including medicine 
and musculoskeletal physiotherapy. 
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